Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1990

IHC Affiliated Services v. The Industrial
Commission of Utah, Employers' Reinusrance
Fund, and Lawrence Schmidt : Brief of Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Larry R. White; Kirton, McConkie & Poelman; Attorney for Petitioner.
Ralph L. Dewsnup; Wilcox, Dewsnup & King; Attorneys for Lawrence Schmidt; R. Paul Van Dam;
Attorney General for Utah; Attorneys for Industrial Commission of Utah; Erie V. Boorman; Attorney
for Employer\'s Reinsurance Fund.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, IHC Affiliated Services v. The Industrial Commission of Utah, No. 900231 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2618

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

OOCKbf w
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
IHC AFFILIATED SERVICES,

)
Case No. 900231-CA

Petitioner,
vs.

]
;

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ]
UTAH, EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE ')
FUND, and LAWRENCE S CHMIDT,

Priority No. 7

Respondents.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT LAWRENCE SCHMIDT
Brief in response to Petitioner's Request for Review of
a unanimous Final Order of the Industrial Commission which Order
sustained the decision of Administrative Law Judge Gilbert
Martinez.

Larry R. White, Esq,
KIRTON, MCCONKIE & POELMAN
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Petitioner
Paul R. Van Dam, Esq.
Attorney General for Utah
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorney for Industrial Commission
of Utah
Erie V. Boorman, Esq.
160 East 3 00 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0580
Attorney for Employer's Reinsurance Fund

Ralph L. Dewsnupf Esq.
WILCOX, DEWSNUP & KING
2020 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Respondent
Lawrence Schmidt

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
IHC AFFILIATED SERVICES,
Petitioner,

1
]

vs.

]

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH, EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE
FUND, and LAWRENCE SCHMIDT,

'
)

Case No. 900231-CA

Priority No. 7

Respondents.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT LAWRENCE SCHMIDT
Brief in response to Petitioner's Request for Review of
a unanimous Final Order of the Industrial Commission which Order
sustained the decision of Administrative Law Judge Gilbert
Martinez.

Larry R. White, Esq.
KIRTON, MCCONKIE & POELMAN
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Petitioner
Paul R. Van Dam, Esq.
Attorney General for Utah
23 6 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorney for Industrial Commission
of Utah
Erie V. Boorman, Esq.
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0580
Attorney for Employerfs Reinsurance Fund

Ralph L. Dewsnup, Esq.
WILCOX, DEWSNUP & KING
2020 Beneficial Life Tower
3 6 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Respondent
Lawrence Schmidt

[This page left blank intentionally.]

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF CONTENTS

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND
STANDARD OF REVIEW

1

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

4

STATEMENT OF FACTS

5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT
THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION ACT SHOULD BE
POINT I:
LIBERALLY CONSTRUED IN FAVOR Of COVERAGE
OF THE EMPLOYEE
POINT II:

12

13

THE UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT DOES
NOT APPLY TO DETERMINATIONS OF AN EMPLOYEE'S
ELIGIBILITY FOR BENEFITS UNDER THE WORKER'S
COMPENSATION ACT; HOWEVER, THERE WAS
COMPLIANCE WITH UAPA'S REQUIREMENTS, IN ANY
EVENT
14

POINT III: THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE SHOW THAT MR.
SCHMIDT'S EMPLOYMENT CONTRIBUTED SOMETHING
SUBSTANTIAL TO INCREASE THE RISK THAT HE
ALREADY FACED IN EVERYDAY LIFE BECAUSE OF
HIS PRE-EXISTING CONDITION; THEREFORE, LEGAL
CAUSATION WAS SHOWN
18
POINT IV:

POINT V:

THE "MEDICAL CAUSATION" TEST DID NOT NEED
TO BE MET BY THE EMPLOYEE, GIVEN THE
EMPLOYER'S WAIVER OF THE DEFENSE; HOWEVER,
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES MEDICAL CAUSATION,
IN ANY EVENT

22

EVIDENCE ABOUT MR. SCHMIDT'S TRAVEL SCHEDULE
AND TRAVEL FATIGUE WAS MATERIAL AND RELEVANT
TO THE OCCURRENCE OF HIS INJURY AND ITS
INTRODUCTION WAS NO SURPRISE
25
-1-

POINT VI:

THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION RECEIVED OR CONSIDERED EVIDENCE
IN THE FORM OF A MEDICAL REPORT WHICH WAS
OFFERED AFTER THE DECISION OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE WAS RENDERED;
HOWEVER, EVEN IF IT HAD, SUCH AN ACTION
WOULD HAVE BEEN HARMLESS ERROR, IF ERROR
AT ALL

2

CONCLUSION

3

ADDENDUM

3

-11-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases
Allen v. Industrial Commission,
729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986)...1, 4, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 26, 27
American Roofing Co. v. Industrial Commission of Utah.
752 P.2d 912 (Utah App. 1988)

26

Askren v. Industrial Commission,
15 Utah 2d 275, 391 P.2d 302 (1964)

13

Grace Drilling v. Board of Review.
776 P.2d 63 (Utah App. 1989)
Hester v. South Qgden City,
660 P.2d 243 (Utah 1983)

2,21
2,3

Jones v. California Packing Corp.,
121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640 (1952)

13

Kennecott Corp. v. Industrial Commission of Utah.
740 P.2d 305 (Utah App. 1987)

28

North Beck Mining Co. v. Industrial Commissionf
58 Utah 486, 200 P. Ill (1921)

13

Olsen v. Industrial Commission of Utah,
776 P.2d 937 (Utah App. 1989)

3, 17, 31

Sisco Hilte v. Industrial Commission of Utah
766 P.2d 1089 (Utah App. 1988)

18, 26

Smith & Edwards v. Industrial Commission of Utah.
770 P.2d 1016 (Utah App. 1989)

21, 26

Traylor Bros.. Inc./Frunin-Colnon v. Overton.
736 P. 2d 1048 (Utah App. 1987)

1, 3, 27

Utah Dept. of Admin. Services v. Public Service Commission,
658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983)
1, 3
Worker's Comp. Fund v. Industrial Commission
761 P.2d 572 (Utah App. 1988)
Zimmerman v. Industrial Commission of Utah,
785 P.2d 1127 (Utah App. 1989)

-iii-

3
2, 18

STATUTES AND RUIZES
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended
§ 35-1-1

15

§ 35-1-10

15

§ 35-1-16

15

§ 35-1-45

3, 4, 18

§ 3 5-1-46

15

§ 35-1-82 .52

15

§ 35-1-82.53

1

§ 35-1-88

15, 30

§ 63-46b-l

14, 15

§ 63-46b-12

16

§ 63-46b-16

1, 2, 18

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Rule 14

-iv-

1

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Petitioner, IHC Affiliated Services, (the employer),
appeals a final Order of the Industrial Commission which upheld,
and adopted as its own, the decision of the Administrative Law
Judge in favor of Respondent Lawrence Schmidt, (the employee). The
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of the case pursuant to §35-182.53, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, §63-46b-16, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended, and Rule 14 Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE 1; Whether the Industrial Commission overturned or
sustained the decision of the Administrative Law Judge.
Standard of Review: Interpretation of an order presents
a legal issue which is reviewed under a correction of error
standard.

Utah

Commission,

658

Dept. of Admin. Services v. Public Service
P.2d

601,

608

(Utah

1983);

Traylor

Bros.

Inc./Frunin-Colnon v. Overton, 736 P.2d 1048, 1050 (Utah App.
1987) .
ISSUE 2: Whether the "legal causation" test of Allen v.
Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986), was met.
Standard of Review:

The findings of the Industrial

Commission and Administrative Law Judge will be affirmed if they
are supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the

1

whole

record

before

the

court.

§63-46b-16(4)(g), Utah

Code

Annotated, 1953, as amended; Grace Drilling v. Board of Reviews,
776 P. 2d 63 (Utah App. 1989); Zimmerman v. Industrial Commission of
Utah, 785 P.2d 1127 (Utah App. 1989).
ISSUE 3:

Whether the "medical causation" test of Allen

v. Industrial Commission, supra, was met.
Standard

of Review:

The findings of the

Industrial

Commission and Administrative Law Judge will be affirmed if they
are supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the
whole

record

before

the

court.

§63-46b-16(4)(g), Utah

Code

Annotated, 1953, as amended; Grace Drilling v Board of Review, 776
P.2d 63 (Utah App. 1989); Zimmerman v. Industrial Commission of
Utah, 785 P.2d 1127 (Utah App. 1989).
ISSUE

4:

Whether the

admission

of evidence

on the

employee's travel schedule and travel fatigue which immediately
preceded the occurrence of his injury was improper.
Standard of Review:

The admission of evidence of the

type in question is a discretionary function of the judge which is
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.

Hester v. South

Ocrden City, 660 P.2d 243 (Utah 1983);
ISSUE 5:

Whether the post-Hearing evidence was admitted

and, if so, whether its admission prejudiced the outcome of the
case.
2

Standard of Review:

The determination of whether the

post-Hearing evidence was admitted is a question of law which is
reviewed under a correction of error standard. Utah Dept of Admin.
Services v. Public Service Commission, 658 P.2d 601, 608 (Utah
1983); Traylor Bros. Inc./Frunin-Colnon v. Overton. 735 P.2d 1048,
1050 (Utah App. 1987). The determination of whether its admission,
if any, unduly prejudiced the outcome is reviewed under the abuse
of discretion and harmless error standards. Hester v. South Ocrden
City, 660 P.2d 243 (Utah 1983); Worker's Comp. Fund v. Industrial
Commission, 761 P.2d 572 (Utah App. 1988); Olsen v. Industrial
Commission of Utah, 776 P.2d 937 (Utah App. 1989).
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
Respondent

Lawrence

Schmidt

submits

that

the

interpretation of §35-1-45, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,
is determinative of this case.

Said statute reads as follows:

Each employee mentioned in Section 3 5-14 3 who is injured and the dependents of each
such employee who is killed, by accident
arising out of and in the course of his
employment, wherever such injury occurred, if
the accident was not purposely self-inflicted,
shall be paid compensation for loss sustained
on account of the injury or death, and such
amount for medical, nurse, and hospital
services and medicines, and, in case of death,
such amount of funeral expenses, as provided
in this chapter.
The responsibility for
compensation and payment of medical, nursing,
and hospital services and medicines, and
funeral expenses provided under this chapter
shall be on the employer and its insurance
3

carrier and not on the employee.
The pivotal portions of the foregoing statute have been
interpreted in Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah
1986).

Plaintiff submits that no questions of constitutional

import arise in connection with this case.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a Worker's Compensation case in which Respondent,
Lawrence Schmidt

(employee) claims entitlement to compensation

benefits as a result of a back injury which he sustained while
engaged in work-related activities for his employer, IHC Affiliated
Services.
At

the

Worker's

Compensation

Hearing,

Mr.

Schmidt

presented evidence relating to the background and circumstances
leading up to the actual lifting event which produced injury.
also produced medical evidence on the cause of his injury.

He
Mr.

Schmidt admitted that he had a pre-existing back injury.
The Administrative Law Judge who conducted the Hearing
entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that held Mr.
Schmidt to be entitled to compensation benefits from both the
Employers Reinsurance Fund and his self-insured employer, IHC
Affiliated Services.

The Employer's Reinsurance Fund did not

appeal the decision and has since paid the amounts it was required
to pay. The employer asked the Industrial Commission to Review the
4

Order of the Judge.
The Industrial

Commission sustained

the Findings and

Decision of the Administrative Law Judge, (a fact disputed by IHC) ,
and adopted them as its own.

The employer (IHC) appealed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Prior to the time of his employment with IHC Affiliated
Services, Lawrence Schmidt had sustained a back injury which had
produced a ten percent impairment of his person.

(R. 333.)

This

pre-existing injury impairment rating was established by Dr. Joseph
Charles Rich, Neurosurgeon, and was undisputed by the employer. (R.
333,34.)
Lawrence

Schmidt

began

working

for

Services in late February, 1988. (R. 38.)
Product

Information

Manager,

he

was

IHC

Affiliated

In his position as

required

to

demonstrate

computer software applications for hospitals throughout the United
States.

(R.

36,39.)

His

travel

schedule

requirements were controlled by his employer.

and

presentation

(R. 38-39.)

His

demonstrations were conducted from a standing position. (R. 49-50.)
From February 1988 through the time of his injury on May
6, 1988, Mr. Schmidt was on the road an average of three to four
days per week. (R. at 38.)

Sometimes his schedule was so demanding

that he would leave his home on Sunday and not return until Friday.
(R. 38.)

While on the road he worked 10-20 hours per day. (R. 57.)
5

As part of his job Mr. Schmidt typically carried three
bags with him when he traveled:

(1) A computer case weighing

approximately 18 pounds, containing a computer, power cord, P.C.
viewer, phone line, cable, multiple outlet switch, transformer and
batteries; (2) A personal bag weighing approximately ten pounds,
containing a calendar, agendas, maps, books and papers; and (3) A
garment bag weighing approximately 25 pounds, containing extra
suits, underclothing, shoes, toiletries, etc.

(R. 20,37,69,70.)

Mr. Schmidt frequently traveled with others.
practice was to not check any baggage.

(R. 42.)

Their

In order to

comply with the airline requirements restricting carry-on baggage
to two parcels, Mr. Schmidt would consolidate his computer bag and
his personal bag into one 28 pound package for carrying. (R. 42.)
The 25 pound garment bag constituted his second parcel.
During the week of his injury on May 6, 1988, Mr.
Schmidt's travel schedule was particularly demanding. He left Sailt
Lake City at 12:30 p.m. to fly through Dallas-Fort Worth where he
connected with another flight to Baltimore.
was at 8:30 p.m.

(R. 46.)

Arrival in Baltimore

In Salt Lake City he carried his 53

pounds of baggage from his car to the airport, through the airport
and onto the plane, where he stowed it.

He then unloaded it in

Dallas, carried it through the airport to his connecting flight and
loaded it again.

He repeated the unloading and loading processes
6

in Baltimore, carried the baggage to a rental car, travelled to a
hotel and carried the baggage to his hotel room.

(R. 47.)

The

next morning, February 3, he arose early so as to be at a hospital
to conduct a demonstration by 7:30 a.m..

(R. 47.) He carried all

baggage to the car, travelled to the hospital, unloaded his bags
and conducted the demonstration, which lasted until afternoon.
Upon completion of the demonstration, he repacked the equipment,
loaded it into the car and repeated the loading, unloading and
carrying processes again in traveling by commuter airline to White
Plains, New York.

(R. 48)

Mr. Schmidt arrived in White Plains, New York at 6:45
p.m..

He checked into the hotel by 8:00 or 8:30 p.m..

The next

day, February 4, he arose at 6:00 a.m. and left by 7:00 a.m. in a
rental car to make hospital demonstrations which continued through
Thursday, February 5. (R. 49, 53.) The demonstration went overtime
and

Mr.

Schmidt

had

to

destination, Oklahoma City.

reschedule
(R. 49.)

his

flight

to

his

next

He left White Plains, New

York in a hurry, loaded his baggage and drove to the JFK Airport
(approximately one and one-half hours away) where he caught a
flight to Dallas and then to Oklahoma City.
in Oklahoma City at approximately 11:00 p.m.

(R. 49.)
(R. 50.)

He arrived
Again he

carried all his bags to and from a rental car counter, loaded the
car, drove to the hotel, unloaded the car and carried the bags to
7

his room.

(R. 50.)

He never hired porters or paid bell captains

because of lack of funds to do so.

(R. 48.)

approximately 45 minutes from the airport.

The hotel was

(R. 51.)

By the time

he arrived and got to bed, it was after 2:00 a.m. on Friday, May 6.
(R. 53.)
After a few hours of sleep, Mr. Schmidt arose and
traveled to a hospital with his equipment and baggage where he
conducted another demonstration for approximately three-fourths of
the day.

(R. 51.) He was scheduled to return to Salt Lake City on

a mid-afternoon flight but the demonstration went overtime and he
had

to

reschedule.

(R. 51.)

After the demonstration

was

completed, Mr. Schmidt again packed up his equipment and carried it
back to the car and the airport where he waited for his flight to
take him back home.

(R. 51.)

required by his employer.

While waiting, he filled out forms

(R. 52.)

Mr. Schmidt testified that, as he sat in the airport, he
"was tired . . . very tired."

(R. 53-54.)

He had had an awkward

time carrying his baggage and moving through the airport.

(R. 54.)

It was hard to balance the bags on his shoulders, put them through
x-ray machines, and carry them about.
generated

additional

security

questions

(R. 54.)
and Mr.

The computer
Schmidt was

required to do a lot of repeated picking up and putting down of his
bags.

(R. 54.)
8

As Mr. Schmidt sat at the airport, filing out forms, he
became irritated at the tobacco smoke which was being produced by
the crowd of people which had begun to congregate around him.
52.)

He decided to move.

his bags.

(Id.)

(R.

He reached down to again pick up

He reached for the bag containing his personal effects

and the computer equipment and jerked it to his shoulder.
52,73,81.)

(R.

The bag being lifted weighed approximately 28 pounds.

(R. 73-74.)

As he jerked the bag to his shoulder, he felt a sudden

pull on his back which produced pain that intensified as the night
progressed.

(R. 74-75,77,82.)

Prior to the jerking of the bag,

Mr. Schmidt had not experienced any back pain.

(R. 74.)

He had

not seen any doctors about any symptoms relating to back pain since
1986, a period of approximately two years.

(R. 78-79.)

When Mr. Schmidt returned to Salt Lake City, his back was
stiff and uncomfortable.

(R. 54.)

pain became progressively worse.

On Saturday and Sunday his back
(R. 55.)

On Monday, May 9th, Mr.

Schmidt returned to work and reported the injury to his supervisor.
(R. 1, 56.)

Two days later, on May 11, 1988, after continued

worsening

the pain

of

in his back, Mr.

Cottonwood Hospital Emergency Room.

Schmidt went

(R. 199.)

to

the

Thereafter he was

treated by several doctors, culminating in the performance of back
surgery upon him by Dr. Joseph Charles Rich on July 29, 1988.
207-208, 284-296, 224-225.)
9

(R.

Mr. Schmidt's claim for Worker's Compensation Benefits
was denied by his employer.

(R. 2.)

He, therefore, filed an

application for hearing with the Industrial Commission in which he
stated that his injuries occurred while he was involved in business
travel for his employer.

(R. 9.)

The Hearing on Mr. Schmidt's application was held on June
9, 1989.

During the hearing, Exhibit A-l, which containeu a.

medical report from Dr. Joseph Charles Rich, dated May 18, 1989,
was offered into evidence and received without objection.
156-57, 23.)

(R. 96,

In the letter, Dr. Rich says that he found Mr.

Schmidt to have a right L-4/5 disc herniation which he said was
caused by the lifting episode in the airport on May 6, 1988.
156.)

His

probability.

opinion

was

(R. 156.)

expressed

to

a

reasonable

(R.

medical

He also expressed his opin .on that Mr.

Schmidt had a twenty percent permanent partial disability, ten
percent of which was pre-existing and ten percent of which was from
the lifting episode.
Schmidt's

traveling

(R. 157.)
and

lifting

He further stated that Mr.
were

environment in which injuries can occur.

enough

to

produce

an

(Id.)

In an effort to narrow the issues before him at the
Hearing, the Administrative Law Judge asked the attorney for the
employer

whether

causation."

there

was

evidence

to

establish

"medical

(R. 27.) The attorney replied that Dr. Rich's report
10

did that.

(Id.)

The attorney then stated that the basic defense

was "legal causation."

(Id.) At a later point in the Hearing, the

Administrative Law Judge commented that it appeared that the
primary issue in the case was one of legal causation.

(R. 30.)

The attorney for the employer agreed that such was his belief.
(Id.)

After further discussion with counsel, the Administrative

Law Judge stated that the major issue was whether the "legal
causation" requirements had been met, whereupon he ruled that he
would only receive testimony relating to that issue.

(R. 34.)

Following the Hearing, the Administrative Law Judge
issued his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law holding that Mr.
Schmidt's travel and work activities were unusual or extraordinary
and were, therefore, sufficient to meet the "legal causation"
requirements,

thereby

Compensation Benefits.

permitting
(R. 305.)

him

to

recover

Worker's

The Judge ordered the employer

to pay such portions of the award as related to the new injury and
ordered the Employer's Reinsurance Fund to pay for aggravated preexisting injury.

(R. 306.)

Although the employer appealed

the decision to the

Industrial Commission, the Employer's Reinsurance Fund did not
appeal.

The Reinsurance Fund has made payments to Mr. Schmidt as

ordered.
On March 29, 1990, the Industrial Commission entered its
11

order denying the employer's appeal and specifically adopting the
Administrative Law Judge's Findings as its own.

(R. 11-12.)

The

exact wording of its Order was "IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT the
Applicant's Motion for Review is hereby denied and the Order of the
Administrative Law Judge is sustained."

(R. 12.)

The employer appeals the Industrial Commission Order to
this Court.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Petitioner (the employer) argues erroneously that the
Industrial Commission altered the Decision of the Administrative
Law

Judge.

Such

Administrative

Law

is

not

the

Judge was

case.

adopted

The
in

Decision

full,

of

the

although

the

Commission seemed to point out, by way of explanation, that it
would have applied a lesser standard which Mr. Schmidt could have
met without the need to show legal causation.
When one examines all of the circumstances leading up to
the event which actually produced injury to Mr. Schmidt, it can be
seen

that

the

Administrative

Law

Judge

and

the

Industrial

Commission did not err in concluding that Mr. Schmidt had been
subjected to unusual and extraordinary exertion which had set the
stage for his injury.
Medical

causation

was

not

an

issue

before

the

Administrative Law Judge, it having been conceded by the employer
12

before the Hearing began.

However, even if it had been an issue,

the evidence before the Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial
Commission was sufficient to support the holding in the employee's
favor.
An employer who schedules the work week for and levies
unusually demanding work requirements upon his employees cannot
complain of surprise that the employee relies upon such events as
being contributing factors to his injury.

Such factors are part

and parcel of the events producing injury.
There is no indication that the Industrial Commission
received

or

considered

post-Hearing

evidence

in

making

its

decision. Even if such an action had been taken, however, and had
been erroneous, such an error was harmless.
ARGUMENT
Point I
The Worker's Compensation Act Should Be
Liberally Construed In Favor Of Coverage Of
The Employee.
It has been the policy of the Courts that the Worker's
Compensation Act should be liberally construed in favor of coverage
of the employee.

(See North Beck Mining Co. v. Industrial

Commission, 58 U. 486, 200 P. Ill (1921) ; Jones v. California
Packing Corp. , 121 U. 612, 244 P.2d 640 (1952); and Askren v.
Industrial Commission, 15 U.2d 275, 391 P.2d 302 (1964).
13

This

over-arching principle, designed to reduce the amount of expense
and

delay

associated

with

resolving

application in the present case.

coverage

disputes,

has

Mr. Schmidt, the respondent,

submits that he has shown that he is entitled to the benefits
awarded

by

the

Administrative

Law

Judge

and

the

Industrial

Commission and that their decisions should be upheld.
Point II
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act Does Not Apply To
Determinations Of An Employee's Eligibility For Benefits Under
The Worker's Compensation Act; However. There Was Compliance
With UAPA's Requirements In Any Event.
Major portions of the employer's Brief are devoted to
contentions that the Industrial Commission failed to abide by the
requirements of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA). Mr.
Schmidt maintains that the UAPA does not apply to the Order of the
Industrial

Commission, but

that, even

if

it did,

all

of

its

requirements were met.
The

scope

and

applicability

of

the

Administrative

Procedures Act are established by statute:
(1)
Except as set forth in Subsection
(2), and except as otherwise provided by a
statute superseding provisions of this chapter
by explicit reference to this chapter, the
provisions of this chapter apply to every
agency of the State of Utah and govern:
* * *

(2)
The provisions of this chapter do
not govern
* * *

(i)

. . . the initial determination
14

of anv person's eligibility for benefits under
Chapters 1 and 2. Title 35 . . . .
(§63-46b-l, Utah
added.)

Code Annotated,

1953, as

amended.

Emphasis

The Worker's Compensation scheme in Utah is contained in
Chapter 1, Title 35, Utah Code Annotated.

Under that system it is

the Industrial Commission that is charged with the responsibility
to make determinations of a person's eligibility for benefits.
(See §35-1-1, 35-1-10, 35-1-16, 35-1-46, and 35-1-82.52, Utah Code
Annotated,

1953,

as

amended.)

The

Commission

appoints

Administrative Law Judges and, either the Commission or the Judges
may preside

at Hearings held

to adjudicate disputes

over the

awarding of benefits. (§35-1-82.52, Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as
amended.)

The Commission may or may not follow the recommendations

of the Administrative Law Judges since it is specifically empowered
by the Legislature to make its investigation,
in such manner as in its judgment is best
calculated to ascertain the substantial rights
of the parties and to carry out the spirit of
the Workmen's Compensation Act.
(§35-1-88, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.)
The decision of an Administrative Law Judge is subject to
review by the Industrial Commission.

commission Orders are final

unless overturned by the Court of Appeals, §35-1-82.53, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended.
The

foregoing

makes
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it

clear

that

the

initial

determination of a person's eligibility for Worker's Compensation
Benefits is not completed until the Industrial Commission rules.
Thus, the Utah Administrative Procedures Act does not begin to
apply until the time that the Industrial Commission decision is
placed for review before the Utah Court of Appeals. In the present
case, the employer's arguments that the Administrative Procedures
Act was not followed by the Industrial Commission, are not well
taken.
Even if the Utah Administrative Procedures Act were
deemed to govern the actions of the Administrative Law Judge and
the Industrial Commission in the Worker's Compensation setting, it
is Mr. Schmidt's position that there was compliance. The Order of
the Industrial Commission denying IHC's Motion for Review contains
a designation of the statute permitting its review of the ALJ's
decision.

It also states the issues reviewed, adopts findings and

conclusions, specifically affirms the Administrative Law Judge and
states the reasons for its disposition.

Such an Order is in

compliance with §63-46b-12(6)(c), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended.

(The Utah Administrative Procedures Act.)
Although

its Order is not a model of clarity, the

Commission specifically addresses the issues of whether the Allen
tests were met and whether they needed to be met.

In dicta, the

Commission states its view that the Administrative Law Judge need
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not have applied the Allen test. However, notwithstanding its own
opinion about what could have been done, the Commission, in
unmistakable

language, adopted the Administrative Law Judge's

Decision (including Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) as its
own:
The
Commission
believes
that
the
Administrative Law Judge did not abuse his
discretion and should therefore be sustained.
The Commission, adopts the Administrative Law
Judge's findings as its own.
* * *

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT the
Applicant's Motion for Review is hereby denied
and the Order of the Administrative Law Judge
is sustained.
(R. 366.)
Since the Administrative Law Judge's Decision was adopted
in its entirety, there can be no legitimate argument that the
Industrial Commission

failed to give proper deference to the

Judge's position.
In Olsen v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 776 P.2d 937
(Utah App. 1989), the Industrial Commission's decision contained
statements

which

were

incorrect

and

inappropriate.

Those

statements were dicta and were held by the Court to be harmless
where they did not appear to have affected the Commission's
decision.

(Id. at 940, n.2.)

A similar situation presents itself

in the present case. Although the Commission has included arguably
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incorrect views about Mr. Schmidt's pre-existing condition in its
Order, those views are inconsequential and harmless due to the fact
that its ultimate decision was to adopt the decision of the
Administrative Law Judge.
POINT III
The Circumstances Of This Case Show That Mr. Schmidt's
Employment Contributed Something Substantial To
Increase The Risk That He Already Faced In Everyday
Life Because Of His Pre-Existincr Condition;
Therefore, Legal Causation Was Shown.
Since the present case arose after the effective date of
the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, the standard of review to
be applied appears to require that there be substantial evidence in
the whole record before the Court to support the Industrial
Commission determination if it is to be upheld.

(See §63-46b-

16(g), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended; and Zimmerman v.
Industrial Commission of Utah, 785 P.2d 1127 (Utah App. 1989).)
Mr. Schmidt submits that an examination of the entire record shows
that the Industrial Commission's Decision should be upheld.
In Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P. 2d 15 (Utah
1986), the Utah Supreme Court held that where a worker had a preexisting condition, he could not recover damages for on-the-job
aggravation of that condition unless there was some circumstance or
exertion required by the employment which increased the risk of
injury which the worker normally faced in his everyday life.
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(Id.

at 25)

The Court said:
Our cases make clear that "the aggravation or
lighting up of a pre-existing disease by an
industrial accident is compensable . . . ."
[Citations omitted.]
To meet the legal
causation requirement, a claimant with a preexisting
condition must show that the
employment contributed something substantial
to increase the risk he already faced in
everyday life because of his condition. This
additional element of risk in the work place
is usually supplied by an exertion greater
than that undertaken in normal, everyday life.

(Id. at 25.

Emphasis added.

Note: The Allen case interprets the

requirements of §35-1-45, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.)
It is important to note that unusual exertion is one way
to show an increased risk of injury. It may even be the usual way.
But it is not only way. What is required is that the claimant show
that the conditions of his employment were not just typical of
everyday life but were usual in a way that subjected him to
stresses that were greater than those experienced in the nonemployment life of the average person.

(Id. at 26; see also Sisco

Hilte v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 766 P.2d 1089, 1090 (Utah
App. 1988).)
The Administrative Law Judge's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law recount the grueling nature of Mr. Schmidt's
travel schedule in the days preceding his injury.

The transcript

of the Hearing contains ample support for those Findings.

Mr.

Schmidt was required by his employers to leave his home on Monday

and travel by air and ground in a span of only five days from Salt
Lake City, to Dallas, to Baltimore, to White Plains, New York, to
JFK International Airport, to Oklahoma City and back to Salt Lake
City.

He made stops in each place, where he was required to lift

and carry fifty-three pounds of baggage repeatedly loading and
unloading it into rental cars, airport metal detectors, hotel
rooms, elevators, overhead storage compartments, etc.

He set up

and took down equipment for demonstrations in multiple different
cities.

He stood on his feet all day, worked ten to twenty hours

each day, sometimes got only a few hours of sleep, and then rushed
to catch a plane where he was confined in an airline seat until
arriving at his next destination.

The night before his injury, he

did not get to bed until 2:00 a.m. only to find himself with a need
to awaken early so that he could spend three-fourths of the day on
his feet in another demonstration.

He was fatigued and spent.

Such a regimen is not something ordinarily nor typically
faced by a modern day worker as part of his everyday life.

The

travel demands, especially with respect to lifting, carrying and
transporting

substantial

amounts

of

baggage,

were

"substantial" under the requirements of the Allen case.

indeed
The

lifting and pulling, tugging and toting, and nearly 24 hour per day
demands of an extraordinarily vigorous travel schedule over a five
day period, certainly increased the risk faced by Mr. Schmidt that
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his pre-existing back injury would become aggravated.
Mr. Schmidt's employer argues that the simple lifting of
twenty-eight pounds of baggage is not unusual exertion.

Mr.

Schmidt agrees. If that is all that he had done to become injured,
he would not have made a claim.

However, as the evidence shows,

Mr. Schmidt did much more than simply lift twenty-eight pounds of
baggage.

In Smith & Edwards v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 77C

I
P.2d 1016 (Utah App. 1989), the Court noted its past rejection of
the idea that there was some sort of weight test that qualified fqr
I
unusual exertion.

It said that an examination of the facts aiid

circumstances of the employment activity was required before a
determination could be made about whether the activity was usual or
unusual.

(See Id. at 1018.)

Mr. Schmidt submits that the

Administrative Law Judge's holding

(which was adopted by the

Industrial Commission), that his injury occurred in connection with
work-related

duties that were

"unusual or extraordinary" was

correct and that legal causation under the Allen case was properly
established.
This Court has previously held that "substantial evidence
is 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.'"

Grace Drilling v. Board of

Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989).

In applying the standard

of review applicable to this case the Court will look at the "whole
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record" and will not substitute
reasonably conflicting views.

its judgment as between two

(Id.)

There is relevant evidence

which would reasonably support the conclusion that, given the
totality of the circumstances, Mr. Schmidt was subject to exertions
which were unusual or extraordinary

in comparison to typical

nonemployment activities expected of late twentieth century men and
women.

Therefore, this Court should affirm the decisions of the

Industrial Commission and its Administrative Law Judge.
Point IV
The "Medical Causation" Test Did Not Need To Be Met
By The Employee, Given The Employer's Waiver
Of The Defense; However, The Evidence Establishes
Medical Causation, In Any Event.
A second element of the Allen test on which proof is
ordinarily required of a claimant who alleges work-related injury
when he has a previous history of injury, is in the "medical
causation" test. To prove medical causation, a claimant must show
that his injury is "medically the result of an exertion or injury
that occurred during a work-related activity." Allen v. Industrial
Commission, 729 P. 2d 15, 27 (Utah 1986) . To do this "claimant must
show by evidence, opinion, or otherwise, that the stress, strain,
or exertion required by his or her occupation led to the resulting
injury or disability."

Id.

At the time of the Hearing before the Administrative Law
Judge, the medical causation issue was conceded by the employer.
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It, therefore, was not a subject which was addressed by the
Administrative Law Judge in his decision. Even if it had not been
conceded, however, there was sufficient unrebutted evidence to have
supported the decision that medical causation was proved by Mr.
Schmidt.
Excerpts from the Hearing transcript demonstrate that the
employer waived the "medical causation" issue.
THE COURT:
Okay.
Mr. White, if you
would like to respond to these four claims and
raise any defenses.
MR. WHITE: Well, the defense is raised
in our Answer, and that is, we do not believe
that the accident occurred, there not being
legal causation, as required under the Allen
case and its progeny.
THE COURT: Okay. So you are claiming no
accident? Now, do we have medical evidence to
establish medical causation?
MR. WHITE:
does that.

I think Dr. Rich's report

THE COURT:
Okay.
So the defense is
basically legal causation then?
MR. WHITE: Right.
(See Hearing transcript, R. 27.)
Later in the record, the following exchange between the
Court

and

counsel

for the

employer

reinforced

the

statement:
THE COURT: It appears that the primary
issue in this case is one of legal causation.
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previous

Is that correct?
MR. WHITE:

That's my belief, yes.

(See Id. at 30.)
Following further exchange between the Court and counsel
for both parties, the Court made the following statement:
Okay. So the major issue here is one of legal
causation and today we will just receive
testimony regarding that issue.
And, Mr.
Dewsnup, if you would like to call your
witness.
See Id. at 34.
Based upon the foregoing dialogue and statements, it is
clear that there was no reason for Mr. Schmidt to present extensive
evidence on issues of medical causation. The introduction of such
evidence, in the face of the employer's stated position, would have
been outside the scope of the issues and would have been a waste of
time and resources. Mr. Schmidt submits that it would be improper
to allow an employer to admit that certain elements of a claim were
not disputed, waive its defenses thereon, and then permit the
employer to complain that those elements were not proven to the
requisite degree.
Notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Schmidt need not have
produced evidence on the "medical causation" issue, the record
contains ample evidence to have supported a finding that it was
proven satisfactorily.

The letter of Dr. Joseph Charles Rich,
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which was received without objection, states:
On
the
basis
of
reasonable
medical
probability, the fact that the patient
apparently had no previous history of right
leg pain or right sciatica prior to his
lifting episode of May 1988, it is probable
that there is a causal [sic] between his
lifting episode and his right L-4/5 disc
herniation.
(See record at 156-157; 332-333.)
Dr. Rich's
objection.

(R. 23.)

letter was received

in evidence without

No rebutting testimony was offered by the

employer.

(R. 62.)

No request was made that a medical panel be

convened.

In compliance with Allen, the claimant showed that his

actual injury occurred as a result of his exertion while engaged in
a work-related activity. Dr. Rich's letter squarely addressed that
issue. The doctor's opinion regarding the effects of travel, when
coupled with lifting, does not go to the medical causation question
—

at least not directly.

His opinion only lends support to the

background facts and circumstances which are part of the "evidence,
opinion and otherwise" which help to show that the stage was set
for injury by the stresses, strains and exertions required by Mr.
Schmidt's occupation.

(See Allen, supra at 27.)
Point V

Evidence About Mr. Schmidt's Travel Schedule and
Travel Fatigue Was Material And Relevant
To The Occurrence Of His Injury And
Its Introduction Was No Surprise.
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The employer argues that the Administrative Law Judge
improperly admitted evidence of Mr. Schmidt's travel schedule and
travel fatigue at the time of the Hearing.

It claims that such

evidence was irrelevant, immaterial and surprising.
The relevance and materiality of Mr. Schmidt's travel
schedule and travel fatigue are obvious from the Allen decision and
its progeny.

In Allen, after explaining the standards of finding

legal and medical causation, the Court said that, in order to
determine whether there was legal causation, it needed more facts,
such as the number of crates that the claimant had moved, the
distances they were moved, the weight of the crates, the size of
the area where moving took place, etc.

(Allen, supra at 28.)

In

other words, the Court needed complete background information.
In Smith & Edwards v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 770
P. 2d 1016 (Utah App. 1989) , the Court rejected the proposition that
it decide whether an activity was usual or unusual based on a
single factor such as the weight of an object lifted.
said

that

"evidence

of

the

facts

employment activity was required."

and

Instead, it

circumstances

of

the

Id. at 1018; see also Sisco

Hilte v. Industrial Commission of Utahr 766 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Utah
App* 1988); American Roofing Co. v. Industrial Commission of Utah,
752 P.2d 1912, 1915 (Utah App. 1988).
In the present case, the lifting incident which produced
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injury was simply the culminating event in a hectic week of unusual
exertion and stress.

The background information on Mr. Schmidt's

travel schedule and fatigue was probative and material to the
precise question which was to be decided under the Allen legal
causation test.
The employer's argument that it was surprised at Mr.
Schmidt's introduction of evidence about his travel schedule is not
well

taken.

Unlike

Traylor

Brothers, Inc./Frunin-Colnon

v.

Overton, 736 P.2d 1048 (Utah App. 1987), the attorney for IHC in
the present case was not misled into thinking that travel was a
non-issue.

On the contrary, the travel issue existed from the

start:
1.

In

Mr.

Schmidt's

Application

for

Hearing

he

describes the accident's occurrence with the following opening
words: "While involved in business travel for my employer . . .."
(R. 2.)
2.

The employer took Mr. Schmidt's deposition on May 5,

1989 at which time it had every opportunity to learn of Mr.
Schmidt's reliance on travel factors.
3.

The

employer

itself

set

Mr.

Schmidt's

travel

schedule and was well aware of the demands which had been placed
upon him.
4.

The employer paid Mr. Schmidt's expenses for travel
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and knew of the time required of him to fly, drive, transport
baggage, make presentations, complete paper work, set up, take down
and engage in other activities*.
5.

The employer's defense of "no legal causation"

implies an awareness of the issues which make up a part of such
defense, including the background facts and circumstances of an
employee's work activities.
6.

IHC may not invoke a rule as a defense and then

claim that it had no notice of the very issues necessary to meet
the defense which it asserted.
The employer's citation of Kennecott Corp. v. Industrial
Commission of Utah, 740 P.2d 305 (Utah App. 1987), is similarly
inapposite to the disposition of this case. In Kennecott the issue
was whether an employer who was put on notice of a claim made for
injury in 1984 should have to pay for injuries occurring in 1969
and 1976 about which it had no notice. The Court ruled that notice
of the claims involving earlier injuries was required.

In the

present case, the question is not whether the employer had notice
that it might have to pay for previous injuries, but rather whether
or not notice of an injury is also notice of the facts and
circumstances surrounding that injury.

Mr. Schmidt submits that

his employer was on notice of his claim and the circumstances which
produced it.
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Point VI
There Is No Indication That The Industrial Commission
Received Or Considered Evidence In The Form Of A
Medical Report Which Was Offered After The Decision
Of The Administrative Law Judge Was Rendered;
However. Even If It Had, Such An Action Would Have
Been Harmless Error, If Error At All.
The last point argued by the employer is that the
Industrial

Commission

improperly

admitted

evidence

after .the

Hearing before the Administrative Law Judge. While it is true that
a supplemental letter from Dr. Rich was sent to the Industrial
Commission, there is no indication that the letter was received or
considered.

Furthermore, if the letter had been received and

considered, such conduct would, at worst, be harmless error, since
the Commission sustained the Findings of the Administrative Law
Judge who never saw the letter.
The Hearing before the Administrative Law Judge in this
matter, took place on June 9, 1989.

(R. 20.)

At the time of the

Hearing, a letter from Dr. Joseph Charles Rich, dated May 18, 1989,
was received in evidence without objection.

(R. 23, 156-157.) The

Administrative Law Judge's Decision, including Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, was entered on July 10, 1989.

The Decision

refers to information contained in Dr. Rich's letter of May 18,
1989.

(R. 300-307.)

On August 8, 1989, the employer moved for

Industrial Commission Review of the Administrative Law Judge's
Decision.

(R. 310-311.)

On September 5, 1989, the claimant's
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attorney wrote to Dr. Joseph Charles Rich asking him to elaborate
on certain points of his first letter (R. 359-360.)

On September

8f 1989, Dr. Rich wrote a second letter in reply to the letter of
claimant's attorney.

(R. 356.)

On October 2, 1989, the second

Rich letter was submitted to the industrial Commission and to
opposing counsel pursuant to §35-1-88, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
amended, for such consideration as they deemed it appropriate to
give.

(R. 354-361.)

On October 6, 1989, attorneys for IHC

objected to the submission and asked that it be stricken.
364.)

(R. 362-

The record does not disclose a formal ruling by the

Industrial Commission on the admissability of the second letter
from Dr. Rich.

However, the Commission makes no reference to the

letter in its Decision which was entered March 29, 1990.

(R. 365-

367.)
In the Order of the Commission denying employer's Motion
for Review, it does make reference to the first letter of Dr. Rich.
However, it makes no reference either directly or indirectly to the
second letter. Furthermore, such reference as is made is of little
significance since it was cited in support of a position which the
Commission asserted only in dicta.
As has been pointed out in Point II, above, the actual
holding of the Commission was that the Administrative Law Judge's
Findings and Decision were adopted as the Commission's own.
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It is

undisputed that the Administrative Law Judge did not see or
consider the second letter of Dr. Rich.

If his Findings and

Decision were adopted, then the second letter had no bearing on the
Decision.

Its submission, if erroneous, was harmless.
Even

if the second

letter

from Dr. Rich had been

considered by the Industrial Commission, and the consideration
thereof had been erroneous, the error would have been harmless,
since it addressed either (1) issues of causation which were either
not before the Commission or the Administrative Law Judge due to
the waiver by the employer, or (2) issues on which there was
already

sufficient

evidence

to

support

the

Commission and the Administrative Law Judge.

Decision

by

the

(See Olsen v.

Industrial Commission of Utah, 776 P.2d 937, 940, n.2 Utah App.
1989.)
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CONCLUSION
It is the position of Mr. Schmidt that the Hearing
process and Industrial Commission review thereof were not governed
by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act.

Even if they had been

so governed, the proceedings were conducted properly.
The effect of the Order by the Industrial Commission was
to sustain the Administrative Law Judge's Decision and adopt it as
the Commission's own. There was no alteration of the findings and
conclusions

of the Judge even though the

Commission appears

inclined to have applied a different standard.
Evidence of Mr. Schmidt's travel schedule and travel
fatigue was properly admitted and helped to establish both legal
and medical causation under the Allen standards.

Additional

evidence from the first letter of Dr. Joseph Charles Rich also
buttressed Mr. Schmidt's claims as to medical causation which need
not have been proven given the waiver by counsel for Mr. Schmidt!s
employer.
Any effect

of a post-Hearing

submission

of medical

information was harmless error.
The policy of the Worker's Compensation scheme is to
construe the law liberally in favor of coverage for the employee.
Mr. Schmidt's undisputed injury has been construed by both an
Administrative Law Judge and the unanimous Industrial Commission to
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warrant

coverage.

This Court should affirm

those Decisions

awarding benefits to Mr. Schmidt.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of October, 1990.

RALPW L. DEWSOTJP
WILC0X, DEWSNUP & KING
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT
LAWRENCE SCHMIDT (EMPLOYEE)
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I hereby certify that I mailed copies of the BRIEF OF
RESPONDENT on the 1st day of October, 1990, by United States mail,
postage prepaid, to the following:
Larry R. White, Esq.
KIRTON, MCCONKIE & POELMAN
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Petitioner
Paul R. Van Dam, Esq.
Attorney General for Utah
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorney for Industrial Commission
of Utah
Erie Boorman, Esq.
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

84154-0580

Attorney for Employer's Reinsurance Fund
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ADDENDUM
Respondent

Lawrence

Schmidt

relies

materials contained in the brief of Petitioner.
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Addendum

